September 2020 - Notes of Decision - Foreclosure & Property

*Disclaimer* - the below case summaries are not to be construed as legal advice, they are nonexhaustive, and they contain only my own summary/interpretation of the cases so noted. 

 NO. CAAP-18-0000699

U.S. BANK NA v. COMPTON, et al

Background: Appeal from the Court's grant of Appellee's (Bank's) motion for summary judgment on foreclosure.

 Errors Alleged:

  • Did U.S. Bank fail to meet its burden of establishing it was the holder of the subject promissory note (Note) at the time it filed the complaint and thus the bank lacked standing?

  • Did U.S. Bank fail to establish that Appellant had been provided adequate notice of the alleged default.

Standing:

Rules:

  • Holder of the Note: "In Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaii 361, 390 P.3d 1248 (2017), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that in order for a foreclosing plaintiff to establish standing to foreclose, the plaintiff must show entitlement to enforce the promissory note at the time the foreclosure action was commenced. Id. at 368, 390 P.3d at 1255."

  • Custodian of Records Required: "even a custodian of records must lay a proper foundation for the admission of records of regularly conducted activity pursuant to HRE Rule 803(b)(6)."

Holding:

  • The testimony/declarations of the alleged custodians were insufficient:

    • The declarations "failed to establish the foundation for the Note to be admitted into evidence. Behrendt, 142 Hawaii at 45, 414 P.3d at 97; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Mattos, 140 Hawaii 26, 32-33, 398 P.3d 615, 621-22 (2017)", and the "declarations [did] not lay adequate foundation to establish that U.S. Bank had possession of the Note when the Complaint was filed. Behrendt, 142 Hawaii at 45-46, 414, P.3d at 97-98; Mattos, 140 Hawaii at 33, 398 P.3d at 622; Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaii at 370-71, 390 P.3d at 1257-58."

    • The Declarations did not attest that the "custodian" had "familiarity with the record-keeping system of the business that created the record to explain how the record was generated in the ordinary course of business." Behrendt, 142 Hawaii at 45, 414 P.3d at 97".

 

NO. CAAP-15-0000478

PROTECT AND PRESERVE KAHOMA AHUPUA#A ASSOCIATION v. MAUI PLANNING COMMISSION

 (MEMORANDUM OPINION)

 Background: Developer wanted a Special Management Area Permit.  Appellants (neighbors) moved to intervene citing environmental and aesthetic implications.  The Maui Planning Commission denied the intervention.

 Circuit Court Affirms: the circuit court affirmed the commission decision.

Appellants Argue:

  • They had injury-in-fact standing to intervene;

  • They had standing to intervene as a matter of right;

  • Denying permissive intervention constituted an abuse of discretion;

  • The commission engaged in unlawful de facto rule making on intervention and its intervention rules were invalid as written and applied;

  • The commission violated Appellants' due process rights, and;

  • The commission failed to find the project would be consistent with the General Plan and Community Plan before approving the permit.

 Holding re Intervention: Appellants argued that "the proposed Project would adversely affect their group as adjacent landowners because it would diminish their use and enjoyment of their properties, decrease their properties' sale and rental value, and would have adverse impacts on the protected resources within the Coastal Zone Management Area [and that] the proposed Project would threaten a variety of environmental and aesthetic interests protected under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)."

Rules:

  • Consistent Denials of Intervention = Administrative Rule Making: Appellants argued that the commission "has adopted a practice of always denying complete Petitions to Intervene claiming that all petitioners' interests are not distinguishable from the general public." and that this "amounted to the enforcement of "a new rule regarding those who have standing to intervene in SMA permit application proceedings" that was promulgated without following the rule making procedures under HRS chapter 91."

  • Rule - Need to be Affected Differently than General Public at Large: Because Appellants do "not have a property interest in the land that is subject to the Commission's action and did not lawfully reside on said land [then] under MPC Rule 12-201-41(b), [Appellants] would qualify to have standing to intervene as a matter of right only if they could demonstrate that they would "be so directly and immediately affected by the matter before the commission that their interest in the proceeding is clearly distinguishable from that of the general public."

  • Rules re Standing:

    • Injury in fact: "In order to establish standing to intervene in an administrative proceeding, plaintiffs must demonstrate an "injury-in-fact," which requires them to "have suffered an actual or threatened injury; the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and a favorable decision would likely provide relief for the plaintiff's injury." In re Application of Maui Elec. Co., 141 Hawaii 249, 270, 408 P.3d 1, 22 (2017) (MECO) (citation omitted).

    • Environmental Cases: "Environmental plaintiffs must meet this three-part standing test but need not assert an injury that is different in kind from an injury to the public generally." Id. (citation omitted). This less rigorous standing requirement that applies in environmental cases draws support from the Hawaii Constitution, article XI, section 9. Dep't of Transp., 115 Hawaii at 320, 167 P.3d at 313.

Holding re Standing to Intervene - Appellant's Had Standing via Threatened Injuries-in-Fact: Appellants' "direct personal environmental and aesthetic interests, including those of adjacent landowners, coupled with their articulated concerns of potential actual injury from the Project, sufficiently established a threatened injury that is fairly traceable to [the Project].

 Denial of Due Process:

  • Rules Re Asserting the Right:

    • Hearing Req'd: "'constitutional due process protections mandate a hearing whenever the claimant seeks to protect a "property interest." MECO, 141 Hawaii at 260, 408 P.3d at 12 (brackets omitted) (quoting Pele Def. Fund, 77 Hawaii at 68, 881 P.2d at 1214).

    • Two-Step Process: In determining claims of a due process right to a hearing, we apply a two step analysis: "(1) is the particular interest which claimant seeks to protect by a hearing 'property' within the meaning of the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions, and (2) if the interest is 'property,' what specific procedures are required to protect it." Id. (citation omitted).

  • Rules re Whether Hearing is Required: When determining the procedures required to comply with constitutional due process, we consider the following three factors: "(1) the private interest which will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures actually used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including the burden that additional procedural safeguards would entail." HELCO, 145 Hawaii at 17, 445 P.3d at 689 (quoting Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City Council Cty. of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 361, 378, 773 P.2d 250, 261 (1989).

  • Holding - Court Erred Because Appellants Properly Asserted a Property Interest:

    • Appellants "asserted a right to a clean and healthful environment in this case as defined by the CZMA, HRS Chapter 205A, which includes the duties and operation of the Commission in regulating the SMA use permit procedure and requirements."

    • Appellants "were entitled to a contested case hearing by the Commission to comply with procedural due process, which includes the right to submit evidence and argument."

 Commission's Duty to Make Findings:

  • Appellant's Contend: that "the Commission was required to find the Project consistent with the Maui County General and Community Plans prior to orally approving Carr Development's SMA permit application despite the County's designation of the Project as an HRS § 201H-38 housing development."

  • Holding: "we conclude that on remand, the Commission is required under the CZMA to make specific findings on the Project's consistency with the Maui County General and Community Plans prior to approval of Carr Development's SMA permit application.

September 2020 - Notes of Decision - Family

*Disclaimer* - the below case summaries are not to be construed as legal advice, they are nonexhaustive, and they contain only my own summary/interpretation of the cases so noted. 

NO. CAAP-19-0000208

ST v. KT

 Error Alleged - Student Loan Debt Issue: Wife argued that the Family court erred in "finding that valid and relevant considerations (VARCs) existed to justify excluding Husband's premarital student loan debt in the court's property chart and property division, and not charging Husband for his student loan debt that was paid during the marriage."

 Holding - Not Enough Information re Court's Exclusion of Husband's Student Loan Debt:

  • Lower Court: excluded Husband's premarital student loan debt from the marital estate calculation because both parties benefited from Husband's schooling during the marriage and because there was a post-divorce asset disparity favoring Wife which justified exclusion of Husband's debt.

  • ICA - Not Enough Info: "unable to discern from the Family Court's findings and our review of the record how the Family Court calculated the [parties'] post-divorce asset disparity," and therefore found that "the Family Court erred in relying on this disparity […] to justify the exclusion of Husband's student loan debt that was paid during the marriage.

September 2020 Case Summaries - Criminal

*Disclaimer* - the below case summaries are not to be construed as legal advice, they are non exhaustive, and they contain only my own summary/interpretation of the cases so noted. 

 INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS:

 NO. CAAP-18-0000620; STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUAMANU, Defendant-Appellant

(summary disposition order)

 Background: Appellant was charged with 2nd degree murder; following a jury trial he was convicted of lesser included offenses.

 Errors Alleged:

  1. Whether the Court erred where it precluded Appellant from cross-examining the State's witness regarding the witness' pending criminal charges because the charges were not for crimes involving dishonesty.

  2. Whether the jury instructions regarding self defense were insufficient as they did not require the jury to find use deadly force unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.

  3. Whether there was insufficient evidence to find that Appellant stabbed the complaining witness where there was not direct evidence of the stabbing.

ICA Holding:

  1. Cross-examination Issue - Error: the ICA found that the Court erred by precluding the cross examination. The witness had pled no contest and was sentenced to probation prior to trial. 

    • The ICA Stated: "Under these circumstances, information about [the witness'] probation status could have served as a basis for the jury to conclude that [the witness] was biased or had motivation to testify in favor of the State… [w]ithout allowing such cross-examination, the jury did not have "sufficient information from which to make an informed appraisal of the witness's motives and bias." (citing Levell, 128 Hawaii at 40, 282 P.3d at 582.)"

  2. Jury Instruction Issue - No Error: the ICA noted that Appellant was convicted of manslaughter which required the jury to "find beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knew there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct could cause the decedent's death and that [Appellant] consciously disregarded that risk." (citing State v. Schnabel, 127 Hawaii 432, 450 n.33, 279 P.3d 1237, 1255 n.33 (2012).  Therefore, the manslaughter conviction established that "the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used deadly force."

  3. Sufficiency of the Evidence Issue - No Error:  The ICA found that the "circumstantial evidence [was] of sufficient quality and probative value to enable the jury to make reasonable inferences in determining that [Appellant] recklessly caused the death of the decedent.

 

NO. CAAP-19-0000349; STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KANAKAOLE, Defendant-Appellant

(summary disposition order)

Background:

  • "Following a bench trial, [Appellant] was convicted of one count of Terroristic Threatening in the Second Degree (TT2)."

  • [Appellant was] alleged to have told Complainant during the altercation that if his wife were there, or found out that Complainant had gotten rid of his glasses, his wife would shoot or kill Complainant.

Error Alleged: "[Appellant] contend[ed] that the District Court wrongly convicted him based on insufficient evidence that he made a "true threat."

ICA Holding re True Threat - Error:

  • Rule: "the "true threat" [must be] "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution."" (citing State v. Chung, 75 Haw. 398, 862 P.2d 1063 (1993)).

  • Insufficient Evidence: "we cannot conclude that either variation of the alleged threat was "objectively capable of inducing a reasonable fear of bodily injury in the person at whom the threat was directed and who was aware of the circumstances under which the remarks were uttered."" (citing Valdivia, 95 Hawaii at 476, 24 P.3d 672).

 

NO. CAAP-19-0000319; STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID, Defendant-Appellant

 Background: Appellant was found guilty of manslaughter.  He sought to have the complaining witness' Blood Alcohol Concentration admitted, but the Court only allowed testimony as to the "presence of alcohol" in the complaining witness' blood, but not testimony as to the actual blood alcohol concentration because no witness could testify as to what the blood alcohol concentration number actually meant.

 Holding - No Error: "[E]xcluding the evidence of [the complaining witness'] blood-alcohol concentration level did not clearly exceed the bounds of reason or disregard rules or principles of law and was not substantially detrimental to [Appellant]'s defense. We thus conclude that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of [the] blood-alcohol concentration level without an expert witness." (emphasis added).

 

NO. CAAP-19-0000583; IN THE INTEREST OF GH

 Background: The family court adjudicated Minor a law violator as to one count of Sexual Assault in the First Degree (Sex Assault 1), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-730(1)(b)2, and two counts of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree (Sex Assault 3), in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b)3.

 Error Alleged:

  1. Did lower court err by excluding Evidence of CW's alleged past sex assault allegations as they were inadmissible under HRE Rule 412?

  2. Does Rule 412 Conflict with the general Rule 613 Balancing Test?

 Rules:

  • HRE 412: limits use of past sex allegations against CW, but Subsection "C" allows for a preliminary hearing on the issue.

  • Rule re conflicting statutes: "Where a plainly irreconcilable conflict exists between a law of general application and a law of specific application concerning the same subject matter, the specific authority will be favored." State v. Wallace, 71 Haw. 591, 594, 801 P.2d 27, 29 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Greyson, 70 Haw. 227, 235, 768 P.2d 759, 763-64 (1989)).

Holding Re Rule 412 - the Minor Did Not Meet the Procedural Requirements of HRE Rule 412: "[A]s Minor conceded at trial, he did not provide written notice that he intended to introduce the evidence fifteen days prior to trial, as required by HRE Rule 412(c)(1) [and] Minor has not argued that an exception to the written notice requirement applied.

Holding re the alleged Conflict Between the Rules: HRE Rule 412 is a law of specific application, whereas HRE Rule 613 is a law of general application, therefore any alleged conflict is weighed in favor of Rule 412.

 

SUPREME COURT:

 SCWC-14-0000844; STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. KAPAHUKULA KALE VOORHEES, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

(summary disposition order)

 Error Alleged: whether Petitioner's jury trial waiver knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

Ernes Rule:

  • Court's Duty: "[C]ourts have a “serious and weighty responsibility” to “ensur[e] that [a defendant’s] jury trial waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” and that therefore “the record must reflect a colloquy establishing a true understanding based on a totality of circumstances of the particular case.”" (citing Ernes, 147 Hawai‘i at 323, 326, 465 P.3d at 770, 773).

  • True Colloquy: "In other words, the court must conduct a “true colloquy” — a “discussion and exchange between the trial court and the defendant sufficient for an ascertainment based on the record that the defendant fully comprehended the constitutional rights being waived.”" (citing Ernes at 324, 465 P.3d at 771).

 Holding:

  • Error - Not Knowing/Voluntary/Intelligent: "it cannot be said that [Petitioner's] jury trial waiver was established as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary [where the] court did not conduct any inquiry into [Petitioner's] background [and where the ]court’s yes or no questions […] centered around confirming [Petitioner's] signature and initials on the waiver form [rather than] his understanding of the constitutional right to a jury trial."

  • Counsel Representation Not Enough: "although the record indicates that [Petitioner] was represented by counsel and that his attorney explained the jury trial waiver form to him, this is not enough to outweigh the lack of “discussion and exchange” establishing [Petitioner's] actual understanding of a jury trial."